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Byrd: Criminal Law: Indefinite Postponement of Sentence

CASE COMMENTS
CRIMINAL LAW: INDEFINITE POSTPONEMENT OF
SENTENCE
Helton v. State, Case No. 29,434, Fla. Sup. Ct., Oct. 29, 1958
Defendant was convicted in 1944. The maximum sentence that
could have been imposed was five years. The trial judge withheld imposition of sentence "until further order of the court," and did not
place defendant, then sixteen years of age, under the supervision of
the Parole Commission. The maximum probationary period was
seven years. Twelve years later the trial judge sentenced the defendant to four years' imprisonment. On petition for writ of habeas
corpus, HELiD, when a trial court attempts to suspend sentencing indefinitely the court has no jurisdiction to impose sentence after expiration of the hypothetical maximum probationary period. Defendant ordered discharged.
At common law the trial courts had no authority to delay indefinitely the sentencing of a convicted man for the purpose of securing future good behavior. 1 However, in early cases, when the trial
courts could not grant a motion for a new trial, the plea of benefit of
clergy arose. This enabled the court to delay imposition of sentence
long enough to take mitigating testimony before punishment was assessed by the court. 2 Although benefit of clergy has no practical
operation in the United States today, 3 most jurisdictions allow a delay
in sentencing during the pendency of a motion for a new trial or to
allow the defendant time in which to perfect an appeal.4
In states where no statute controls, it is generally held that a trial
court cannot allow a conviction to stand and at the same time defeat
its operation by delaying imposition of sentence indefinitely.5 And
'Ex parte Swain, 88 Okla. Grim. 235, 202 P.2d 223 (1949); Howe v. State, 170
Tenn. 571, 98 S.W.2d 93 (1936); Spencer v. State, 125 Tenn. 64, 140 S.W. 597 (1911).
2
State v. Bilansky, 3 Minn. 246 (1895); Snodgrass v. Texas, 67 Tex. Grim. 615,
150 S.W. 162 (1912).
3DALZELL, BENEFrr oF CLRGY IN AMERICA 268 (1955).
4
E.g., Zwillman v. State, 9 N.J. Misc. 66, 152 AtI. 775 (Sup. Ct. 1931); Stone v.
State, 55 Okla. Grim. 209, 27 P.2d 1057 (1933).
5Grundel v. People, 33 Colo. 191, 79 Pac. 1022 (1905); People ex rel Boenert v.
Barrett, 202 Ill. 287, 67 N.E. 23 (1903).
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where the rule prevails that a trial court exceeds its jurisdiction by
suspending the imposition of sentence indefinitely, it has been held
that a court by so doing loses all power in the case and the pronouncement of a sentence at a future time is null and void.6
Before 1941 the trial courts of Florida apparently assumed the
power to defer indefinitely pronouncement of a sentence. The Supreme Court acknowledged this procedure in several opinions even
though there was no statute authorizing such procedure.The Florida Parole Commission was established as an agency of
the executive branch in 1941, with qualified full time employees to
supervise parolees and probationers. 8 The legislation establishing the
Parole Commission provided that "in no case shall . . . the imposition of sentence be suspended . .. unless such defendant be placed

under the custody of said parole commission .... .9 Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court seems not to have previously disapproved a procedure whereby trial courts suspend imposition of sentence indefinitely without placing the defendant under the Parole Commission's
supervision.1o However, those cases are specifically overruled by the
instant case.
In Bateh v. State1 the appellate court held that when a trial
court indefinitely delays imposition of sentence and later sentences
the defendant, it is a deprivation of due process and the sentence is
deemed to run from the time of conviction. The instant case, however,
holds that sentence may not be imposed after expiration of the maximum period of the sentence or probation. The Bateh case indicates
that the court does not lose jurisdiction but rather that imposition of
sentence is to relate back to the original time for sentencing. The
subject case indicates that jurisdiction is lost once the maximum
period expires.
Another alternative is suggested, perhaps unwittingly, by the
Florida Supreme Court. The suspension of sentencing could be
treated as placing the defendant under Parole Commission supervision
6E.g., Ex parte Grove, 43 Idaho 775, 254 Pac. 519 (1927); People ex rel. Fensky
v. Leinecke, 290 11. 560, 125 N.E. 513 (1919); Warner v. State, 194 Ind. 426, 143
N.E. 288 (1924); Collins v. State, 24 Okla. Crim. 117, 217 Pac. 896 (1923).
7E.g., Carnagio v. State, 106 Fla. 209, 143 So. 162 (1932); Ex parte Williams, 26
Fla. 310, 8 So. 425 (1890).
SFLA. STAT. §947.01 (1957).
9Id. §947.01 (4).
loSee Collingsworth v. Mayo, 77 So.2d 843 (Fla. 1955); Pinkney v. State, 37 So.2d
157 (Fla. 1948).
11101 So.2d 869 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
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